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THE COURTS’ DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF 
DECLARATIONS 
1. Introduction: Law-Creation and the Spectre of Retrospective Criminalisation 
To suggest that there should be an important creative role for the courts in the 
development and application of the substantive criminal law is to be guilty of a 
kind of scholarly heresy. Nonetheless, I shall seek to develop a case for this species 
of heresy here. My focus will be the courts’ powers to develop 
the substantive criminal law, and the scope for its 
application, prospectively. First, we shall see that it is already the case that the 
courts use a variety of existing powers, both under statute and at common law, to 
narrow or expand the scope and application of criminal offences, on a prospective 
basis. These existing powers relate to the issuing of declarations as to the status, 
limits or extent of the law.[1] Secondly, I argue that the courts should be 
emboldened to build on these powers through greater openness to 
the circumstances in which declarations may be issued. Currently, the procedure 
leading to the issuing of a declaration on the scope of the criminal law is 
commonly party-driven (driven by one the parties to existing or prospective 
litigation), court-driven (where a court at first instance, of its own motion, refers 
a point of law to a higher court), or in a limited way third party-driven (where the 
third party must be a state official, the Attorney General). I argue that courts 
should be more open to actions for declarations as to the scope of criminal 
offences brought by a broader range of third parties, such as third sector 
organisations devoted to exposing wronging. 
Scholars in the positivist tradition have been particularly severe in criticising 
the existence a law-creation role for the courts in criminal cases. For Bentham, 
the courts’ performance of this role led to, ‘uncertainty and uncognoscibility…and 
instead of compliance and obedience, the evil of transgression mixed with the evil 
of punishment’.[2] For the Benthamite, Glanville Williams, wherever there is judge-
made law, ‘the expansion of the law is unavowed…the judges keeping up the 
pretence that they are mere mouthpieces of the law’, whereas, in reality, a 
judicial decision, ‘is often no more than…rationalisation accompanied by 
misdirection and legerdemain’.[3] Williams gloomily concluded, with hyperbole 
worthy of Bentham himself, that, ‘[I]n criminal cases the courts are anxious to 
facilitate the conviction of villains, and they interpret the law whenever possible 
to secure this’.[4] 
As this passage indicates, what gave a sharper edge to these criticisms was that 
the courts’ creative interpretations of the law involved – indeed, were aimed at - 
the imposition of criminal liability on a retrospective basis. By contrast, as I have 
indicated, I shall be concerned with the role of the courts in 
the prospective development of the substantive criminal law. As we will see, far 
from legitimising haphazard, coercive state intrusion into the lives of ordinary 
people (the Benthamites’ main concern), such a role can be understood as a way 
to buttress the individual rights and liberties of private individuals in the modern 
state. To that end, though, it will be important to keep in mind that the 
declaratory procedure with which I will be concerned carries within it an inherent 
limitation on the scope for law reform in the courts, consistent with their 
traditional role.[5] The declaratory procedure gives licence for, at the most, 
interstitial legal change that reflects the best conception or soundest theory of 
the existing law.[6] Bearing this in mind will help to put in its proper 
perspective Benthamite cynicism about the creative role of the courts. I will begin 
by giving two instances in which the courts can influence the development of the 
substantive criminal law prospectively under statutory authority, before turning to 
a common law example. 
2. Using Statutory Powers: From Avoiding Errors to Developing Principles 
A long-standing permission for prospective development of the criminal law is 
provided by section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972. It is known as the 
Attorney General’s Reference procedure. This is a third party-driven declaratory 
procedure, limited to the Attorney General as its instigator. Following an 
acquittal, the Attorney General may refer a point of law that arose in the case to 
the Court of Appeal (which may, in turn, refer the point to the Supreme Court), 
after which the 1972 Act stipulates that the Court, ‘shall’ consider the point and 
give its opinion. The basic aim of section 36 is simply to ensure that an error of law 
which led to an acquittal is not repeated in the future. It is clear, though, that the 
procedure is used in a broad way to resolve points of ambiguity, and to fill 
significant gaps in the law for the future. A prominent example was the use of the 
procedure by the House of Lords to rule on the legal status of a wrongcommitted 
against a foetus born prematurely, as the result of a criminal injury to the mother. 
The House of Lords held that a former foetus may be in the law the victim of 
manslaughter, if (as a new-born baby) he or she dies in consequence of the 
criminal injury to the mother, even though a foetus still in utero is not protected 
by the law of manslaughter.[7] No one doubts that the House of Lords’ declaration 
gave legal effect to this significant development, even though the House of Lords’ 
ruling was prospective by nature. 
Parliament again showed confidence in the courts’ ability to resolve, inter 
alia, ambiguities in the law on a prospective basis, when enacting section 40 of the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which introduces a party or court-
driven declaratory procedure. Section 40 permits a judge to make rulings on points 
of law prior to the trial, rulings which may then be appealed, with possible long-
term consequences for the shape of the law. Lord Hughes explained the process as 
follows, in R v Lane and Letts[8]: 
The ruling under challenge in this case was made by the Crown Court judge 
at a preparatory hearing, held in anticipation of a criminal trial. That means 
that as yet no evidence has been heard and it cannot be known what the 
facts of the case may turn out to be. Such rulings are occasionally necessary 
in order to establish the basis on which the trial will be conducted.[9] 
In Lane and Letts, the two appellants were charged with the offence of entering 
into funding arrangements connected with terrorism, contrary to section 17 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000. The offence is committed when, amongst other things,D, 
‘knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that [the funding arrangements] will or 
may be used for the purposes of terrorism.’ The judge ruled that the phrase, ‘or 
has reasonable cause to suspect,’ did not imply that the applicants must be proved 
to have the relevant suspicion in their minds (a partly subjective test), as well as 
having reasonable cause to do so. The judge ruled, in effect, that it would be 
enough for the prosecution to show merely that there was reasonable cause for the 
relevant suspicion (an objective test), whether or not the appellants themselves 
suspected anything. The Supreme Court endorsed this ruling, declining an 
invitation to apply the ‘strict construction’ principle that would have favoured the 
appellants’ contention that the test for fault was partly subjective (involving 
actual suspicion). The Supreme Court ruled that the legislative context indicated 
that it should be possible to convict under section 17 of the 2000 Act, when the 
prosecution had shown that, objectively speaking, there was reasonable cause for 
suspicion.[10]  The Supreme Court ruling, or declaration, is highly significant in its 
implications for cases brought under section 17, it is authoritative, and it is 
prospective in its effect. 
 Both such ways to develop the criminal law prospectively, through judicial 
creativity (section 36; section 40), are grounded in a statutory permission to act. 
Both can in theory be tied tightly to the lis inter partes. Section 36 could be 
construed (as already indicated) as concerned only with the correction of an error 
of law after a trial upon particular facts. Section 40 could be portrayed as 
concerned only with the prevention of such an error before a given trial, 
although as indicated in Lane and Letts (above), an Appeal Court will give an 
authoritative ruling on the law under section 40 even when the facts are not yet 
known. In practice, though, decisions by the higher courts under these sections are 
treated as authoritative more broadly. They are a source of law having prospective 
effect. In that regard, tere is a third source of such law-making arising out of 
the lis inter partes, but this time at common law. These are obiter statements of 
law in the higher courts (especially statements of the Supreme Court) that 
are intended to have prospective effect: court-driven declarations as to the state 
of the law.[11] A recent example is the decision of the Supreme Court in Ivey v 
Genting Casinos.[12] 
3. Developing the Authority of Obiter Dicta. 
In Ivey, the Supreme Court was concerned with the meaning of section 42 of the 
Gambling Act 2005. Under section 42, an offence is committed when a person, ‘(a) 
cheats at gambling, or (b) does anything for the purpose of enabling or assisting 
another person to cheat at gambling.’ The appellant (Ivey) was a professional card 
player who won a large sum of money, through learning to recognise cards from 
a particular pack by irregularities or imperfections in the pattern on the back of 
the cards: a practice known as ‘edge sorting’. Over a period of time, he won £7.7 
million. The way in which the appellant had won was discovered, and the money 
was not paid over to him. The appellant admitted engaging in edge sorting, but 
claimed that his actions involved legitimate gamesmanship, not ‘cheating’, and 
thus that he was entitled to his winnings. Clearly, there is no obligation to pay out 
winnings obtained by the commission of the section 42 offence of cheating. So, 
did Ivey cheat? A key question for the Supreme Court was whether proof of 
cheating, for the purposes of section 42, necessarily involved proof of ‘dishonesty’. 
The question was significant, because the appellant’s belief that his conduct 
involved no more than ‘legitimate gamesmanship’ might have been capable of 
amounting to a denial of dishonesty, according to the leading decision on the 
meaning of dishonesty in the law of theft, R v Ghosh.[13]According to Ghosh, even if 
ordinary people would regard D’s conduct as dishonest (the first leg of the test), D 
is not be regarded as dishonest unless, at the relevant time, he or she realised that 
ordinary people would regard his or herconduct as dishonest (the second leg of the 
test). The appellant’s claim not to have been dishonest could be based on the second 
leg of the test: a claim that he did not appreciate that ordinary people would regard 
his conduct as dishonest, and thus that he was not ‘Ghosh dishonest’. The Supreme 
Court in Ivey held that ‘cheating,’ for the purposes of section 42 of the 2005 Act, 
did not imply dishonesty, that the appellant cheated, and that he was hence not 
entitled to his winnings. Accordingly, given that a finding of dishonesty was held 
not be essential to proof of cheating under section 42, it follows that the meaning 
of dishonesty, in contexts beyond the interpretation of section 42, had no bearing 
on the ratio – the reason for the decision - in Ivey. 
  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court went on, in a lengthy obiter dictum, to criticise 
the test for dishonesty set down in Ghosh, as it applies to the law of theft. The 
Supreme Court held that the test for dishonesty does not and should notinvolve a 
separate question of whether D appreciated that his or her conduct was dishonest, 
by the standards of ordinary people (the second leg of the test). The test is simply 
whether, taking account of D’s own understanding of the facts, ordinary decent 
people would regard his or her conduct as dishonest (the first leg of the test). 
Crucially, the Supreme Court went beyond mere criticism, to say that Ghosh was 
wrongly decided, in so far as it was an authority for the existence of the second 
leg to the test for dishonesty: 
These several considerations provide convincing grounds for holding that 
the second leg of the test propounded in Ghosh does not correctly represent 
the law and that directions based upon it ought no longer to be given.[14] 
It is one thing, in dicta recognised as obiter, to criticise the substance of a 
previous decision, and hence undermine either or both (as in Ghosh) of its moral 
authority, and the legal foundations of the propositions for which it stands. It is 
another thing – in theory, not possible - through such obiter dicta to change 
the legal authority as such (its power to bind) of the previous decision. Yet, the 
decision in Iveyhas been treated as having had exactly that result. 
To begin with, in DPP v Patterson,[15] whilst recognising that the 
Administrative Court was bound by Ghosh, the President of the Queen’s Bench 
Division (Sir Brian Leveson) said: 
Given the terms of the unanimous observations of the Supreme Court 
expressed by Lord Hughes, who does not shy from asserting that Ghosh does 
not correctly represent the law, it is difficult to imagine the Court of Appeal 
preferring Ghosh to Ivey in the future.[16] 
In GMC v Krishnan,[17] the Administrative Court went further. The question was 
whether D was dishonest in working for another employer whilst on sick leave 
from the primary employer. The Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal was advised by its 
legal assessor to apply the Ghosh test to D’s conduct. The Administrative Court 
held that this was the wrong approach. In the Administrative Court’s view: 
Ivey is clear authority for the proposition that in a case such as this the 
Tribunal should not have considered whether the Respondent must have 
realised that his conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent 
people…I consider that Ivey has superseded the grounds of the Appellant's 
appeal.[18] 
Finally, the Crown Count Compendium (giving guidance to judges on the conduct 
of the trial) now contains the following statement of law: 
Following the unanimous Supreme Court decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos 
[2017] UKSC 67, confirmed as it has been in DPP v Patterson [2017] EWHC 
Admin 2820…the two-limb test of dishonesty set out in Ghosh no longer 
represents the law.[19] 
It is important not to fall victim to the illusion that what the Supreme Court 
was doing in Ivey was merely correcting a mis-statement in Ghosh of what the 
common law definition of dishonesty ‘really’ was, and had hitherto been.[20]To 
recall Lord Reid’s famous metaphor, this is not a case in which, ‘in some Aladdin’s 
cave there is hidden the Common Law [of dishonesty] in all its 
splendour…[requiring only] the magic word Open Sesame,’ but where a bad 
decision [Ghosh] has come about because, ‘the judge has muddled the pass 
word and the wrong door opens’.[21] In reality, the decision in Ivey seeks to secure 
as authoritative in law an alternative interpretation of the concept of dishonesty. 
Thisalternative is rendered plausible in part – just like the Ghosh interpretation it 
is meant to replace – by the fact that, in the words of Lawton LJ in R v Feely,[22] the 
wording of the Theft Act 1968: 
swept away all the learning which over the centuries had gathered around 
the common law concept of larceny and in more modern times around the 
statutory definition of that offence in section 1(1) of the Larceny Act 
1916.[23] 
What is the importance of the ‘mis-statement of the law’ approach, adopted 
in Ivey? The mis-statement approach suggests, in a way the mere development of a 
rival interpretation does not, that the legal ground is clear for an 
authoritative(re)assertion of the ‘true’ legal position. Hence, this approach has 
proved attractive to Appeal Courts in other criminal law cases in which the priority 
is side-lining previous decisions of which the Courts now disapprove.[24] However, 
even if one goes along with this approach, in terms of orthodox legal theory it ought to 
mean no more than this: that the way is in future open for a court of competent 
jurisdiction, expounding as part of the ratio of its decision the meaning of 
dishonesty under the Theft Act 1968, to overrule Ghosh and (re)establish in 
law the meaning of dishonesty defended in Ivey. 
A significant feature of Ivey, thus, is that – as some other cases of high 
authority have done[25] - it seeks to circumvent a well-known feature of the 
system of precedent. This is that court-inspired developments in the 
law with public importance must await the happenstance of the relevant points of 
law arising (if they ever do) in a case in a court of competent jurisdiction, so as 
to permit an authoritative ruling of the appropriate kind to be made, along with – 
if need be - the consignment to history of a previous ruling. Ivey achieves this 
circumvention through the deployment of inherent law-creating powers well 
beyond those provided for, in cases where there has been an acquittal and 
consideration of the case by the Attorney General, in section 36 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1972 (discussed above). The case is used to develop the law in an 
area – theft - beyond the scope of the appeal, something that cannot happen under 
section 36. That is clearly a controversial feature of Ivey, and I will return to 
it shortly. span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; color:#ff0000">What is of most 
importance here is that the Supreme Court sets down, in a manner intended to be 
authoritative, a change to the criminal law that is to be made 
prospectively; a fresh declaratory statement of what the law is (to be), and 
supposedly always was. In that regard, the effect of the declaratory statement 
cannot be to deprive a disapproved precedent of legal 
status; only formal overruling or abolition through legislation can do that. Even so, 
the declaratory statement may both give licence to inferior courts, at any level, to 
prefer the declaratory statement to the precedent as a matter of 
law, and also provide especially strong reasons to exercise that preference. 
It is probably safe to say that if the Supreme Court intends a declaration to 
be authoritative, that in itself provides an exclusionary reason (a reason not to 
act for contrary reasons[26]) for inferior courts to give directions on the law as it 
is set out in the declaration. So much seems to follow from the very existence and 
purpose of a hierarchy of courts with the inherent power to make rulings on the 
law. What, though, if the declaration clashes with a different understanding 
of the law that has authority – providing exclusionary reasons to follow it - because 
it is a binding precedent (Ghosh)? In that regard, we must take into account the 
extensive review of the law undertaken in Ivey, together with the claim – 
considered above – that the review indicates that the rule in Ghosh constituted a 
mis-statement of the legal meaning of dishonesty. Call this extensive 
review the ‘expert’ dimension to the decision in Ivey. When a superior court 
provides such a dimension to a decision, in support of a declaration concerning the 
state of the law, it is making a claim to greater expertise than that employed by 
any inferior court (however learned its judges) that has made a contrary statement 
of law. That being so, inferior courts in the future have a content-independent and 
peremptory reason to prefer the statement of law in the superior court 
to statements of law in contrary decisions.[27] However, by way of contrast with 
the fact that a court, qua superior court, intends a declaration to be authoritative, 
the content-independent and peremptory status of the expert analysis of the law 
provided in support of the declaration does not prevent it being – in turn – at some 
later point discovered to be wrong.[28] Were that to happen, then the declaration 
would lose the expert dimension to its authority, and there would simply be a 
clash of decisions – Ghosh; Ivey – with claims to represent the law; but that is 
perhaps unlikely. In complex areas of law with a rich legal history, like the law 
of theft, it is comparatively rare for well-researched statements of law to be 
shown to be not just contentious (that would not be enough to deprive a superior 
court’s expertise of its authority), but as clearly wrong. 
Nonetheless, it should be recognised that the non-precedential basis for the 
authority of declaratory statements, at least when they run counter to established 
legal propositions, means that they should be used sparingly. In Ivey, the Supreme 
Court failed to identify any previous cases illustrating systematic or flagrant 
injustice resulting from the need to follow Ghosh. The peg on which the need to 
make the declaration hung was perhaps an underlying concern about what might 
have happened, had Ivey been charged with fraud or (had he taken the money) 
with theft. In either case, the worry might be that Ivey – ex hypothesi unjustly 
– could have denied guilt on the basis that he was not dishonest, by relying on the 
second limb of Ghosh. That is a rather slender basis on which to mount an assault 
on such a long-settled point of law. Even if, then, we should embrace the principle 
of periodic law-development through declaratory judgments bearing on the scope 
and limits of the criminal law, the issuing of such a judgment in this case was 
perhaps a luxury we could have done without. 
 (4) The Use of Declarations in Criminal Cases: General Considerations. 
I consider that there may be situations in which it would be desirable, and 
in no way unjust, that the effect of judicial rulings should be prospective…[29] 
It is important briefly to have explored these three different possibilities, at the 
courts’ disposal, for effecting prospective changes to the criminal law. It is clear 
that the existence of such possibilities is far from anomalous. In turn, though, the 
discussion raises a question about whether an occasion for prospective 
changes made by the courts must always arise, in some shape or form, from an 
individual prosecution and trial (the lis inter partes). It is notable that in each 
instance discussed so far, the courts do not confine their law-making such that it is 
dispositive only in relation to the facts of the case before them. In a case, for 
example, such as Ivey (which raised a narrow point under the Gambling Act 2005), 
the appeal was treated as a springboard from which to launch innovation in a 
related area of law (the meaning of dishonesty under the Theft Act 1968, and by 
implication the Fraud Act 2006). The appeal is treated in that way, because the 
latter issue is equally – if not more so - a matter of general public importance. If a 
legal basis for effecting prospective change can arise in such a way – the 
happenstance of an appeal on a related point of law - why not accept that such a 
legal basis may arise in other ways, perhaps unconnected to individual 
proceedings, but where the case for change is nonetheless compelling? The most 
important such possibility is through public law proceedings seeking a declaratory 
judgment. After some general observations, I will begin by looking at this 
possibility when it bears on the conduct of public officials, before considering 
whether the possibility should be explored in other contexts involving issues 
of general public importance. 
 We should start with a general proposition, set down by Woolf J in the well-known 
case of Attorney General v Able[30]: 
[I]f it is open to a private individual, in exceptional circumstances, to obtain 
[declaratory] relief, it is certainly open to the Attorney General to do 
so, since his right to seek the assistance of the civil courts in upholding the 
criminal law has been fully recognised by the courts.[31] 
In Able, a declaration was sought that conduct – the publication of a document 
about committing suicide – amounted to the offence of aiding, abetting or 
counselling suicide. The strength of the case for seeking the declaration came, in 
part, from the fact that a number of suicides in England and Wales had been 
associated with the recent publication of the document. Where a number of 
people may be affected adversely by the conduct that is the subject-matter of the 
declaration (perhaps on an ongoing basis), and an injunction is for some reason an 
inappropriate remedy, the case for entertaining the application 
is clearly enhanced.[32] The declaration sought was not granted 
in Able, but Able isnonetheless an important case on the scope for obtaining 
declarations in criminal law-related cases. For example, although the action was 
brought by a public official - the Attorney General – it was no bar to the action 
that it concerned the conduct of a private body, the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society.[33] Contrariwise, as Woolf J indicates in the passage just cited, a private 
person or body may seek a declaration against a public body. This is what 
happened in the celebrated case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority.[34]  Mrs Gillick – a mother of young girls - challenged the 
lawfulness of a Department of Health memorandum of guidance indicating that 
contraceptive advice should be available even to those too young to engage 
lawfully in sexual activity. 
The fact that officials or individuals may undertake a (private) prosecution 
against an alleged wrongdoer in order to test the limits of the law, might, in some 
instances, make it inappropriate to permit proceedings to go ahead for a 
declaration concerned with those limits.[35] Having said that, it is equally clear that 
no one should ordinarily have to endure an unnecessary prosecution (and no public 
body should have to waste costs pursuing one), if the matter could be resolved 
through seeking an authoritative ruling beforehand, as by way of declaration.[36] In 
its own way, section 40 of the 1996 Act (discussed above) is an example of this 
principle in operation. Of course, the existence of criminal proceedings in section 
40 cases gives the parties a very direct interest in seeking a ruling; but is having 
such an interest essential, if one is to be permitted to seek a declaration? The 
short answer to that question is ‘no’. Gillick provides an illustration of a case in 
which the possession of only a relatively general interest - as the parent of a child 
covered, in theory, by the advice given in the memorandum – did not make an 
action seeking a declaration improper.[37] The challenge launched in Gillick was 
entertained by the courts even though the key criminal law issue at stake was 
largely hypothetical: whether a doctor, in following the Department of 
Health memorandum and providing contraceptive adviceto a young prson, would 
be engaged in what would now be called criminal encouragement or assistance to 
that young person to engage in unlawful sexual intercourse. Hypothetical though 
that question might have been, there was nonetheless clearly a public interest 
in securing a firm legal foundation for the Department of Health memorandum, 
and that explains the decision to entertain the application for the declaration. 
It is important to note that the family or medical context of the decision 
in Gillick[38] has not set limits to the courts’ willingness to permit applications for 
declarations touching on hypothetical questions of criminal law in other types of 
case, when the public interest clearly favours such a course. An example is R 
(Denby Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice.[39] A man committing a burglary 
suffered serious injuries, from which he was not expected to recover, after he was 
placed in a headlock by the householder. Through legal action taken by his father, 
the man sought a declaration that the so-called ‘householder’s defence’ (giving 
supposed greater leeway to householders to defend themselves against burglars) 
in 76(5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 breached his right to 
life protected by Article 2 of the ECHR. The Queen’s Bench Division found no 
breach of Article 2, but for our purposes what is important is that the application 
for a declaration was heard even though the point of law at issue was still 
hypothetical: the injured burglar had not yet died. It is worth pursuing this issue a 
little further. In R (Dianne Pretty) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,[40] the question was whether the appellant was entitled to a 
declaration that the Director of Public Prosecutions was obliged to undertake in 
advance that, if Pretty were assisted by her husband to commit suicide, the 
husbandwould not be prosecuted under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. 
Rejecting the view that such proceedings were appropriate only for applicants 
unable to take decisions for themselves, Lord Justice Tuckey also said that a 
declaration could in theory be issued when, ‘[t]he existing facts are known or can 
be ascertained, and a precise proposal is put before the court’.[41] This condition 
was clearly met in Denby Collins, in spite of the hypothetical nature of question 
before the court in that case. 
Having said that, it is clear that the courts will not entertain applications 
connected with no more than, ‘mere matters of interest or curiosity or the 
like’.[42] In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex parte Salem,[43] Lord Slynn set down the position as follows: 
In a cause where there is an issue involving a public authority as to a 
question of public law, your Lordships have discretion to hear the appeal, 
even if by the time the appeal reaches the House there is no longer a lis to 
be decided…[but] appeals which are academic between the parties should 
not be heard unless there is a good reason in the public interest for doing 
so.[44] 
Two important points arise from this passage. First, it is clear that the courts 
should not entertain purely hypothetical (‘academic’) questions of law, however 
interesting they may be. Consistent with their traditional dispute-
resolution role,albeit broadly construed, in declaratory proceedings the courts 
must be concerned with a relatively specific factual matrix that gives rise to the 
point of law. That is so, even if (as in Gillick), there need be no alleged wrong in 
issuer causal connection between the parties themselves. Nonetheless, secondly, 
Lord Slynn advocates a broad focus on, ‘good reason in the public interest’ as the 
basis for permitting proceedings to settle questions of law by way of declaration in 
public law cases. This is an indication that, in deciding whether to hear a case, the 
courts are willing to engage in ‘retail sorting’ (treating each case on its merits), 
rather than relying on ‘wholesale sorting’ (creating categories of cases to be 
treated in particular ways, irrespective of the merits of individual cases).[45] With 
this background in mind, let me turn to cases in which I suggest that the courts 
should be willing to countenance prospective development of the criminal law, 
through the use of a declaration. 
(5)  Declarations in Cases Involving Public Officials. 
First, there are cases in which the criminal liability in question is the liability of a 
public official. The offence of misconduct in public office provides an appropriate 
focus. It has been suggested that disputed or unanswered questions about legal 
status are well suited for consideration through declaration proceedings, by way of 
contrast with questions arising in the course of disputes between parties (which 
may often be better resolved in other ways[46]).[47] This may be true, so long as the 
criteria set down by Tuckey LJ in the Diane Pretty case for issuing a 
declaration (considered in the last section) are satisfied, namely that, ‘[t]he 
existing facts are known or can be ascertained, and a precise proposal is put 
before the court’.[48] One such question about status is, when is one a ‘public 
official,’ for the purposes of the offence of misconduct in a public office?[49] 
To give an example, an important issue, apt for settlement by way of 
declaration, is the question of whether the soundest understanding of 
the offence encompasses situations in which an official has left office, but then 
goes on to mis-use information, contacts or influence acquired when in 
office.[50] Arguably, the soundest theory of the misconduct offence covers such a 
situation. A key part of the wrong at issue in misconduct in public office – the 
soundest theory of the offence - is the abuse of public trust. Such trust 
may clearly extend beyond the duration of the ‘office’ itself. Indeed, in some 
cases, its importance may only come fully to the fore once someone has left 
office. For that very reason, this kind of situation is specifically dealt with in the 
offence of bribery. Section 4(3) of the Bribery Act 2010 makes it clear that, for the 
purposes of an allegation of bribery, conduct connected to one’s past performance 
of an official function may be treated as if it had occurred whilst one was still in 
office. There is a great deal to be said for taking the same approach to misconduct 
‘in’ public office. The extension of bribery law, in section 4(3), has revealed a 
potential deficiency in the scope of the misconduct offence that the courts have 
the authority to and should correct, in the light of the soundest theory of that 
offence. As everyone is deemed to know the way that bribery is extended in virtue 
of section 4(3), it might be said that there could be no surprise involved, and no 
unfairness, in issuing a declaration that in future the offence of misconduct ‘in’ 
public office will be interpreted in the same extended way as the notion of 
‘performance of a function’ in the offence of bribery. 
The issue is an important one, in theory suitable for the Attorney General, as 
the Government’s law officer, to take action by seeking a declaration on this 
point: what I called at the outset the limited third party-driven procedure, 
controlled by a state official. There have been numerous instances in which a 
suspicion has been raised that ministers, and many other lower-level public 
officials, have left office to take up well-remunerated employment in the private 
sector, precisely because they have information and can exercise influence 
stemming from their time in the public sector that will benefit their new 
employer.[51] However, the Government’s law officers are as vulnerable as any 
other public officials to the temptations provided by offers of work in the private 
sector that are made in the hope of drawing on the office holder’s experience in 
office. The law officers may have little incentive, then, to seek to extend the 
potential reach of the criminal law into that practice, even though the practice is 
prone to the mis-use of information or influence. Accordingly, the courts should be 
willing, in this area above all others, to entertain applications for declarations 
from (say) third sector organisations with an interest in anti-corruption, such as 
Transparency International.[52] In other words, the courts should be open to the use 
of what was referred to at the outset as the broader third party-driven declaratory 
procedure. 
There is an analogy here, albeit an imperfect one, with civil litigation over 
alleged violations of rights by public officials under the United States 
Constitution.[53] When civil actions are taken against public officials for 
alleged violations of constitutional rights, the US courts have been mandated by 
the Supreme Court decision in Saucier v Katz[54] to take a two-step approach. First, 
taking a view broadly favourable to the claimant, the court should ask whether the 
facts show that a public officer may have violated a constitutional right. If the 
answer to that question is, ‘yes’, then the court should go on to consider whether 
the officer has ‘qualified immunity’ from suit. Immunity will not apply if the right 
violation was ‘clearly established’.[55] By contrast, in a case where the right 
was not clearly established at the relevant time, qualified immunity applies to the 
officer being sued. Most importantly, for our purposes, this means that the 
courtthen has freedom (freedom from the spectre of imposing 
liability retrospectively) to decide the question of whether the officer’s conduct 
should be regarded as amounting to a constitutional violation in the future: the 
freedom to make an authoritative declaration as to the state of the law 
henceforth.[56] It has been argued that Saucier provides a sound basis for resolving 
ambiguity or vagueness in criminal statutes, by the adoption of a similar approach, 
perhaps particularly when the defendant is a public official.[57] 
(6)  Declarations Vindicating Consumer Rights 
It is not only in cases involving public bodies and public law that consideration 
should be given to providing greater scope for applications for declarations as to 
the status or reach of the criminal law. I said at the outset that judicial 
development of the criminal law can be a force for the defence of citizens’ rights 
and liberties. The broader, third party-driven declaratory procedure referred to 
at the outset can create that possibility. Even in cases where a declaration has 
been refused, the courts, as in Able and Gillick (discussed above), have proved 
willing to give general guidance on the legal position: as regards, for example, the 
fault element involved.[58]  Put this point alongside the fact, noted earlier, that (a) 
declarations can be sought against private organisations (as in Able), (b) that it is 
relevant that the declaration may do something to prevent harm continuing to 
occur,[59] (as in Able), and (c) that a sufficiently significant general interest in the 
outcome can give someone standing to seek a declaration (as in Gillick), so long as 
the interest is not purely academic or speculative. What possibilities does 
this open up for the use of declarations in criminal law cases? 
 My overall focus is the creative role of the courts in relation to the criminal law. 
This includes the creative use of the existing law in new factual circumstances, as 
well as the interstitial extension of an existing offence in accordance with the 
soundest theory of the law. For example, it is possible to carve out a role for the 
courts as champions of the consumer, when corporations have used their position 
to increase profits through – so the argument runs – the commission of fraud or 
related offences. That role may be important when, for whatever reason, the 
prosecution services or regulators show no sign of intervening to prevent the 
making of profits through the commission of such offences, or have taken 
inadequate action. Here is a possible example. It was discovered that mobile 
phone companies were continuing to charge millions of phone owners for their 
handsets, even when the original charge for the handset had been paid off: a scam 
worth over £300 million to the companies, with ‘vulnerable’ owners being most 
at risk.[60] Ofcom treats the matter as one of regulatory law, concerned with 
prevention, and in overall terms that may be the right approach.[61] However, with 
such large sums involved and so many people affected, it ought to be possible to 
seek a declaration that the phone companies’ conduct, in continuing to charge for 
a handset that has been paid for, amounts to the offence of fraud contrary to the 
Fraud Act 2006, if the conduct was engaged in knowingly and dishonestly. An 
appropriate body to seek such a declaration might be Ofcom itself, or a consumer 
rights organisation.[62] Permitting third party-driven proceedings for a declaration in 
such circumstances has real potential to benefit the consumer, by putting 
increased pressure on large retailers (not least through exposure in the media). 
A similar approach, might be taken towards other deceptive practices 
engaged in by effective oligopolists, such as big energy companies. An example of 
such a practice is the promise of cheaper bills, if customers switch from variable 
to fixed rate contracts, when it is known by the company that in fact consumers 
will pay in the end an almost identical amount.[63] When Ofgem investigates such 
wrongdoing, it may simply close an investigation, if it receives an assurance about 
future conduct from the company;[64] but is such a response adequate, if there is a 
suspicion of cynical and knowing profiteering on a large scale? The testing of the 
applicability of a fraud offence in such circumstances, by (say) a consumer 
rights organisation seeking a declaration, might apply an appropriately higher 
degree of pressure on both the regulator and the company, to ensure that there 
are adequate deterrents in place. 
As in Able, even if for some reason a declaration is refused, it would still be 
possible for the court to give an indication of what the position would be, if the 
fault elements were made out. Having said that, the fact that, as in Able, 
unacceptable harm may continue to be suffered if nothing is done (consumers may 
face continuing losses on a potentially wide scale), and that regulators and 
consumer advice bodies have a responsibility to minimise or prevent the harm, are 
important public interest reasons for permitting the grant of a declaration. To 
this point one might add that, in consumer cases, the difficulties the prosecution 
services may face in proving criminal wrongdoing by utility or phone companies are 
a further public interest reason to permit pressure to be placed on those firms 
through the issuing of declarations that, in particular circumstances, they may be 
committing criminal offences. 
7. Conclusion: Declarations and the Scope for Law Creation by Courts. 
I have argued that, freed from a concern that their law-making may involve the 
retrospective imposition of novel forms of criminal liability, the courts have 
historically taken the opportunity - and should be encouraged to take it more often 
– to develop the criminal law through the use of one or more declaratory 
procedures: procedures aimed at making statements of law that will have 
authority in future cases. As indicated as the outset, when 
such declaratory statements involve interstitial extensions of the law, it is inherent 
in their nature that such extensions will be limited: they will be reflections of the 
soundest theory of the existing law. How does such interpretive scope compare 
with the scope already acknowledged to exist when the retrospective imposition of 
criminal liability is in issue? 
 It is well-known that the European Court gives national courts surprisingly broad 
scope to develop the criminal law, even when that will involve the retrospective 
imposition of criminal liability. The ECHR has held that, ‘however clearly drafted’ 
a criminal law offence might be, ‘there will always be a need for elucidation of 
doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances,’ and further that 
there was no difficulty on a case-by-case basis with, ‘the progressive development 
of the criminal law through judicial law-making’, so long as, ‘the resultant 
development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be 
foreseen’.[65] That approach has been criticised as giving too much creative power 
to the courts, with (supposed) improvements to the law coming at the expense of 
those on whom liability is imposed retrospectively.[66] The foregoing discussion gives 
rise to the possibility of a different approach that is responsive to such 
criticisms. English courts could adopt the European Court’s approach to 
interpretation of the criminal law when making forward-
looking declaratory statements, but take a more restrictive approach when a 
particular interpretation will involve the retrospective imposition of criminal 
liability in the case in question. For example, in the latter cases, drawing from the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the US courts referred to above,[67]span style="font-
family:'Trebuchet MS'; color:#ff0000"> English courts could require a novel legal 
interpretation to be not merely consistent with the essence of the offence but 
also obviously foreseeable and predictable (not merely ‘reasonably’ foreseeable). 
Beyond these issues, I have argued that greater openness to the use of the 
declaratory procedure to determine the state of the law, in criminal cases, offers 
the possibility of breaking with the traditional model of the criminal 
process, understood as a process in which legal development is almost exclusively 
guided and determined by criminal justice officials.[68] The scope of the criminal 
law should in future be regarded as in a narrow but important way a ‘public law’ 
matter, open to at least some forms of testing and challenge by interested third 
parties. Although I have focused on the possibilities for this under existing powers 
and procedures, a fresh statutory basis could be provided for at least some of 
these developments. For example, the procedure under section 36 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1972 could be widened so that the Attorney General can make use of 
it, not only when there has been an acquittal following trial on indictment when 
the case turned on a point of law, but in a wider set of circumstances. The 
wording of section 36 could be modified such that the procedure could be 
invoked by the Attorney General – perhaps, following consultation with the Lord 
Chief Justice - whenever, ‘s/he desires the opinion of the Court of Appeal [or of 
the Supreme Court[69]] on a point of law which has arisen in [a] case’. 
 In defence of a much more restrictive approach to the development of the 
criminal law by the courts than that advocated here, Tony Smith has argued in 
favour of what he described as the, ‘classical jurisprudential 
position’.[70] This position is that, ‘the criminal courts are expected to prefer the 
value of personal freedom to all others, when there is any doubt about how far the 
criminal law extends’,[71] because the courts are, ‘the custodians of 
civil liberties’.[72] I have sought to turn this argument on its head, by 
suggesting that, when the prospective development of the criminal law is in issue, 
the courts may – and should - use their creative powers in this respect to safeguard 
those very liberties. The courts can do this by clarifying and appropriately 
enhancing the protections offered by criminalisation of official misconduct, but 
also by providing added deterrence respecting the worst kinds of commercial 
malpractice, in a world of increasing privatisation and under-resourced 
regulators.[73] So far as the latter kind of development is concerned, it would entail 
a change in the understanding of the role of the courts as mediators, in particular, 
between the citizen and powerful private entities whose decisions have the 
capacity adversely to affect millions of lives. In itself that may be no bad thing. 
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